Key Takeaways

  • Manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Indexes (PMI) turned positive in Q1 2026, ending 44 months of contraction in Western Europe and more than 20 months in North America.
  • Western European NATO members cannot absorb proposed 5% GDP defense targets; internal research shows they must spend 2.5% of GDP over five years simply rebuilding factories.
  • MiddleGround Capital saw defense quotes jump from 5% to 35% of incoming volume within a single year at a portfolio company making transmissions for motorsport.
  • Long transit times, working capital tied up on the water, and tariff friction have erased foreign labor cost advantages, keeping industrial production in domestic markets.

The First Factory Expansion in Nearly Four Years

Industrial supply chains spent years working off inventory backlogs and rate shocks. That slump ended in early 2026. As John Stewart noted, “The recovery that has started postco is very very recent and it's Q1 of 2026 is the first time that the PMI has moved positive in both North America and Europe. In Europe, it was 44 months of contraction and 20 plus months in North America.” (play from 22:16)

The turnaround does not follow old trade patterns. Offshoring once delivered easy margin expansion, but the math has flipped. Holding inventory on water exposes balance sheets to financing charges and port delays. Paired with tariffs and geopolitical friction, extended transit times have erased foreign labor savings. As Stewart observed: “And even though the labor rates are much less than they are in North America, when you factor in putting all that inventory on the water and the lead times and everything else with it and then the tariffs and the the economic risk, people have stayed in North America with their manufacturing and stayed locally and we've seen it return to North America and Western Europe alike.” (play from 17:13)

Europe Faces a Re-Industrialization Bottleneck

European manufacturing faces a massive demand shock in defense, but the continent cannot absorb the capital being allocated to it. NATO members want military spending closer to 5% of gross domestic product, yet funding alone cannot build hardware when production lines do not exist. Decades of de-industrialization hollowed out the base.

MiddleGround studied this production gap directly. Stewart explained: “We did a study with one of our third party like commercial groups and it's impossible for the EU to spend 5% of GDP on defense. They need to spend two and a half% over the next 5 years just to re-industrialize their countries so that they can actually make the products that they need to make because they don't have the capability.” (play from 31:36)

Stewart views this deficit as an opening for capital: “Europe it's kind of unprecedented opportunity for investment like we haven't seen this much industrialization in Western Europe since World War II and that was because the infrastructure had been destroyed.” (play from 32:54) Tooling, machining, and metal fabrication must be rebuilt before governments can buy finished defense goods.

High-Precision Machine Shops Catch the Spillover

Because primary defense contractors cannot build capacity overnight, military buyers are looking to adjacent precision manufacturers. High-tolerance commercial shops are picking up the overflow.

Stewart cited a MiddleGround portfolio company to show how fast this migration is happening: “A good example, we own a company and it's not a aerospace and defense business. This company makes transmissions for motorsport and so we make transmissions for Indie car, NASCAR, F1 and hypercars and those types of of products... Last year 5% of the quote log of just the quotes that came in, 5% were aerospace and defense related. This year 35% are.” (play from 24:57)

This spike signals that tier-two and tier-three commercial suppliers are becoming defense assets. Buyers with urgent procurement targets are outbidding consumer programs for factory time, altering revenue mixes across industrial niches.

Why It Matters

Western re-industrialization is decoupling factory demand from consumer cycles and anchoring it to defense budgets. Private equity owners of precision machining assets in North America and Western Europe will see multiple expansion supported by sovereign contracts rather than consumer volume. Capital allocators who treat manufacturing as a generic commodity will misprice businesses that now function as strategic infrastructure.