Key Takeaways
- Baylor University evaluates its $2.7 billion endowment against a strict 15% net IRR hurdle for illiquid assets, concentrating its private portfolio into roughly 20 core manager relationships.
- Managing Director Renee Hanna dumped a flat-growth legacy manager on the secondary market at a discount, choosing immediate cash recycling over a five-year lockup with low single-digit returns.
- Baylor pushes private equity and venture GPs to divest the "mighty middle," companies tracking toward 1x to 3x returns that consume partner bandwidth without moving fund-level multiples.
- David Weisburd and Hanna reject the venture norm of automatically defending pro rata rights, arguing that earmarking reserves for stagnant assets destroys capital efficiency.
Selling at a Discount to Beat Cost of Capital
Most institutional investors treat private asset commitments as unalterable ten-year sentences. When performance stalls, LPs wait out the fund life, hoping time cures sluggish growth. Hanna took the opposite path with Baylor's $2.7 billion portfolio. Faced with an older manager producing flat performance, she offloaded the position on the secondary market below paper valuation.
The math came down to Baylor's 15% cost of illiquid capital. “When I look at making that trade, even at a discount relative my cost of capital, which is 15%, it makes perfect sense,” (play from 44:49) Hanna explains. “It was a portfolio construction decision. It would expedite liquidity.” (play from 44:56) Holding a stagnant asset for five additional years just to exit at par produces an annualized return that drags the total portfolio down. By absorbing an optical haircut today, an LP redirects capital into vehicles that can compound above the 15% hurdle.
Liquidating the Mighty Middle
Hanna expects GPs to apply that exact liquidation discipline inside their underlying portfolios. Venture and private equity fund models frequently break on the "mighty middle," businesses that will survive and return between 1x and 3x invested capital, but will never return the fund. Partners spend years sitting on boards, negotiating debt covenants, and shepherding restructuring efforts for assets that cannot change the fund's DPI.
“On the GP side, I think it's leaning into concentration, putting capital behind your best ideas, selling the mighty middle,” (play from 45:49) Hanna notes. “Don't waste your time on things that aren't going to deliver a great outcome. I really appreciate when GPs are very candid about that where they're selling assets that are not going to have the outcome that they underwrote to and they're selling them early.” (play from 46:04)
Taking early liquidity on a 1.5x winner via sponsor-to-sponsor secondary sales or strategic buyouts frees up human time. More importantly, it eliminates the long tail of zombie holdings that erode fund IRR through pure calendar decay.
The Fallacy of Pro Rata Defense
Capital misallocation also plagues fund reserves. Venture firms routinely reserve follow-on checks based on ownership defense rather than marginal return potential. Fund managers pass on writing larger checks into runaway winners because their initial model earmarked those dollars for early-stage portfolio companies that have yet to break out.
Weisburd challenges the logic of ownership preservation for its own sake: “From a purely financial standpoint, there's no such thing as defending your position or defending your pro rata. It's a completely nonsensical thing.” (play from 49:07)
Hanna sees this friction directly when GPs offer co-investment opportunities to LPs instead of taking the check themselves. When LPs ask why the fund will not fund a high-performing business directly, GPs hide behind static reserve models. “The answer is simply, well, we don't have reserves for this company. We have it earmarked for other companies that aren't necessarily as visibly obvious that they're working, right? But those reserves are squishy,” (play from 48:04) Hanna says. “There's no line in the sand that that has to be allocated to that particular company.” (play from 48:15) Dynamic portfolio construction requires stripping reserves from unproven bets and stacking capital into the assets generating actual velocity.
Why It Matters
Institutional capital constraints are turning secondary discounts from a mark of distress into a standard portfolio rebalancing tool. As distributions remain sluggish across private equity and venture books, endowments prioritize cash velocity over paper NAV preservation. GPs that refuse to prune median assets and insist on defending pro rata rights across mediocre companies face direct resistance from LPs calculating the calendar cost of stalled capital.