Key Takeaways
- Todd Abbrecht, Co-CEO of THL Partners, sees public equity markets as an increasingly broken exit route for private equity sponsors running large middle-market funds.
- Transitioning private companies from multi-year capital investment cycles to meeting quarterly earnings targets regularly derails management teams.
- Exiting a control position via an IPO does not create an immediate clean exit; sponsors face restrictive lockups, narrow trading windows, and expensive marketed secondary offerings.
- Abbrecht counters Cliff Asness's famous charge of "volatility laundering" by arguing that expecting daily price discovery for illiquid control assets is an irrelevant comparison.
- Exit realization multiples historically validate portfolio marks, demonstrating that absence of daily trading noise does not equal artificial valuation inflation.
The Broken Pipeline of Public Exits
For decades, taking a portfolio company public sat at the top of the private equity exit hierarchy. After building a company across a 35-year buyout career, Abbrecht has reached the opposite view. The operational rhythm required to run a buyout asset clashes directly with the demands of public equity investors.
“I think I've become maybe increasingly convinced, so my degree of confidence in this is gone up, that for private equity businesses to go public is a really difficult path,” (play from 52:08) Abbrecht explains. “And then sustaining earnings on a quarterly basis for businesses that have been privately owned and intensely focused on long-term value creation is a really, really difficult transition and many, many screwed up.” (play from 0:39)
Beyond operating friction, the mechanics of liquidity destroy the appeal of an IPO for a control sponsor. An initial public offering sells only a minority slice of the equity. The sponsor remains trapped in the stock for quarters, sometimes years, subject to insider lockups and narrow trading windows around earnings calls. When the firm does trim its stake, the exit comes at a steep discount.
“And then to get out, we probably have to do a marketed deal, and we have to pay a bank to broker the transaction for us,” (play from 53:01) Abbrecht says. “So the ability to seamlessly exit a private company through an IPO from a control position is really, really difficult.” (play from 53:09)
The Real Mechanics of Illiquid Control Assets
The slow death of the IPO exit has coincided with public market critics attacking private equity's accounting. Quantitative investors, most visibly AQR's Cliff Asness, argue buyout sponsors benefit from volatility laundering: smoothing out marks to report low volatility simply because illiquid assets do not trade every second on an exchange.
Abbrecht rejects that comparison directly. Public share prices fluctuate based on retail sentiment, automated algorithms, and macro liquidity flows. None of those reflect the underlying operating value of a wholly owned enterprise managed over a five-year horizon.
The real test of private valuations is not whether an interim quarterly mark matches public index gyrations. The test is what buyers actually pay at the point of realization. When sponsors liquidate holdings through sponsor-to-sponsor transactions or corporate sales, transaction multiples reliably validate the valuations carried on the fund's books. The absence of mark-to-market noise is not deception; it is an accurate reflection of control ownership.
Why It Matters
Sponsors running multi-billion-dollar funds are quietly retiring the IPO from their underwriting models, leaning entirely on strategic acquisitions, sponsor-to-sponsor secondaries, and continuation vehicles for distribution. This shift concentrates corporate ownership in private hands longer and leaves public equity investors with an older, slower-growth universe of listings. For LPs, it reinforces that private equity returns stem from long-term capital deployment rather than liquid market timing.